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ABSTRACT  
The article is an attempt to understand Kenya’s electoral management architectural 
context asks fundamental questions; does elections management architectural context have 
the ability to survive a state or group of states? How does election management architecture 
help states function in volatile regions? While answering these, the study asserts; in a 
deepening regionalism, the security effects of one state extend threats to other communities 
of states around it/her. In a critical view from the prism of the International Relations (IR) 
lens, the survival of one state has a spiral survival effect on the other states in such a locality. 
This causes states to have joint and various effects relationships. The nature of regional 
security among neighboring states faces paradigmatic limitations common to their adjacency. 
Security in the era of regionalization is symbiotic thus poor electoral management naturally 
has an impact on the existing peace and security in a regional network of states. This study 
discussed Kenya’s electoral management architecture from the constitutional edicts point of 
view. This encompassed strengths and weaknesses observed and highlight some supportive 
Acts of law found necessary to the study. It moved further to elaborate on the electoral 
management architecture context found relevant to the study. Using relevant themes, the 
study analyzes the region in light of the questions posed and written literature, the research 
justifiably concludes that indeed EM architectural context has a necessary role in volatile 
regions. 
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A. Introduction 
 The history of elections in Kenya 
has been full of challenges. The political 
power games sought to control all political 
processes almost immediately after 
independence. This reflects suggestion by 
Cassandra R. Veney and Paul Tiyambe 
Zeleza (2013) and Paul Tiyambe Zeleza 
(2009) that Kenya emerged out of 
colonialism in 1963, after a prolonged 
liberation struggle, with a political 
economy marked by the existence of an 
authoritarian state, uneven regional 
development, deep social cleavages, and an 
intolerant political culture sustained by 
deep historical memories of grievance and 
injustice. Nationalist ideology both masked 
and reinforced the inherited political 
deformities of the colonial state in so far as 
it mobilized the colonized for freedom 
while simultaneously seeking to 
homogenize them in the inflexible ideology 
of nation-building.  
 Election management bodies 
around the world continue to face 
challenging circumstances, and there will 
be a continued need for organizations like 
IFES to do research, spread best practices, 
and facilitate dialogues. All of this is key to 
advancing better elections around the 
world (Lemargie, 2017). Most elections in 
Kenya since the first multi-party elections 
in 1992 have experienced management 
problems. The gravest occurrence 
emanating from electoral management 
which generated the disputed presidential 
elections in December 2007 made the 
majority of Kenyans flee their homes to an 
extent of crossing regional borders and a 
reported figure of about 1,300 were killed 
(Crisis Group Africa Report, 2008). 
Additionally, the impact extended to the 
neighboring states in East Africa with 
serious implications for security.  Electoral 
Management among states sharing 
common borders has far-reaching impacts 
than being an individual country's affair. 
These include refugee influx due to forced 
migrations, cross border economic losses, 
security stalemates between neighboring 
states, a proliferation of arms, and the 
possibility of the emergence of anti-
government rebel groups. In a major 
perspective, it questions the security of the 
region. The Kenyan electoral management 
of 2007 degenerated the once ‘perceived 
peaceful’ country into a near pariah state 
which threatened the socio-eco-political 
mainstay of the East African region and 
adjacent states. 
 Kenya’s 2007 electoral management 
was unique towards regional security in 
several ways compared to previous ones. 
Both internally and externally the 
uniqueness had some effects. Internally, it 
attracted a number of key personalities 
among the Kenyan political elites as 
contestants than before, the political space 
in the country had greatly experienced 
freedoms required of democracies, 
breakage in the ruling factions that brought 
the second liberation made it a very 
contestable election, and it pitted major 
candidates for the presidential seat who 
come from the two dominant Kenyan 
ethnic communities. Again, externally, the 
heightened move towards regional 
integration which Kenya has always 
championed partly because of her pseudo- 
economic imperialism (Munene, 2017) in 
the region made the 2007 electoral 
management a real regional security 
problem. This study endeavored to find out 
the effects of electoral management on 
Kenya’s neighbors. The intrastate 
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weakness witnessed in this election in 
Kenya confirms neo-liberalism's 
proposition of interdependency of which 
security is part. 
 The existing patterns of conflict 
across the borders and within East African 
Countries cannot be better described if not 
within the confines of Regional Security 
Complex (RSC) to solicit new thinking of 
securitization not used before. In this 
region especially that has had external 
invasions from slavery, to colonialism 
which further dispersed African nations 
into different countries and further 
splitting nations into multi-national states 
and seeking their harmony. 
 The effects of Kenya’s 2007 
electoral management on Kenya’s 
neighbors is a significant step towards both 
regional policies and state policies. This is 
very important to immediate states; 
Tanzania, Uganda, South Sudan, Ethiopia, 
Somalia, and by extension to Rwanda and 
Burundi. These effects range from 
economic to social which turn often to 
security/insecurity dynamics. Whereas the 
effects differ from landlocked countries as 
opposed to Countries accessible to the 
Indian Ocean such as Somalia and 
Tanzania, the issue of traditional 
membership to East African Community 
compounds more effects. In addition, the 
issue of economic dependency on Kenyan 
strong industrial base and hitherto hosting 
and playing host to regional peace 
initiatives to countries such as Sudan/ 
South Sudan and Somalia. This built 
paradigms on stability issues emanating 
from piracy and Al-Shabaab and its 
likelihood spillover.   
 
B. Methods 
This is a study arising from field 
research. It is a series of some of the 
outcomes of an earlier Ph.D. research. The 
compilations herein comprise what diverse 
scholars posit on the subject which was 
analyzed thematically and content-wise in 
the process of literature review. The 
assertions were supported by data 
gathered from the field which forms a 
series of publications from the overall 
study. 
 
C. Result and Discussion 
Kenya’s Electoral Management and 
Constitutional Foundations 
 Under Kenya’s constitution, 
contained in the Elections Regulations 
2012, the types of elections are; General 
election, Referenda, and By-Elections (the 
latter results when an elective seat falls/or 
is presumed vacant in accordance with the 
constitution). Broadly again it means 
Presidential and Other elections (where 
other is in reference to elective positions 
apart from Presidential).  Electoral 
management in Kenya is a democratically 
mandated process and activity by the 
constitution. Right from the preamble, the 
Constitution of Kenya 2010 expresses itself 
to the imperative of elections “we the 
people of Kenya - … RECOGNISING the 
aspirations of all Kenyans for a government 
based on the essential values of human 
rights, equality, freedom, democracy, social 
justice, and the rule of law”. For electoral 
management to reach the verge of 
insecurity as witnessed in the aftermaths of 
the 2007 election, the core issues in the 
stated preamble were totally disregarded. 
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The body manning elections, the 
manner in which elections ought to be 
conducted, and the people to conduct the 
elections are all envisaged in this 
important supreme law. In chapter seven 
“representation of the people” Part two, 
Article 88 sub-article 1; “there is 
established the Independent Electoral and 
Boundaries Commission” (also known as 
IEBC), sub-article two and three espouse 
on the people authorized to conduct the 
business of electoral management in the 
commission, while sub-article four 
elaborates the scope of the commission as 
to kinds of elections and referenda. 
Authoritatively, sub-article five gives an 
emphatic pointer to the performance of 
electoral functions (management) under 
the powers of the constitution and national 
legislations. With this statement, certain 
thoughts are derived; is the constitution 
and the national legislations always 
harmonious? And two, are the national 
legislation enacted or changed with 
electoral timelines in mind? Three, do the 
legislations foresee their effects stretching 
to shake the security fabrics of the state or 
they are guided by temporal parochial 
political interests? To contain EM 
dynamics, the conflicting variables in the 
two must address underlying national 
challenges present and unforeseen. 
 Articles 89, 90, 91, and 92 loosely 
discuss the issues of delimitation, 
allocation of party-list seats, requirements 
for political parties, and legislation on 
political parties in an idealistic sense. 
Whereas the first two (Art. 89 and 90) are 
implicit to IEBC, the latter two are 
seemingly implied to the same body (EMB) 
yet they play very key roles in the electoral 
management architecture and dynamics in 
Kenya’s elections. Though the Political 
Parties Act (Act No. 11 of 2011) provides 
that every registered political party shall 
deposit their party Constitution, 
membership lists together with nomination 
rule with the Registrar Political Parties 
during the registration process. Making a 
leap backward, Articles 86 – makes a 
mention of voting and system used while 
Article 87 points to the timely settling of 
electoral disputes. It is the supposition of 
this research that the disputes imagined 
here are local with no cross border effects 
but with the understanding since 2007 
election that electoral conflicts cannot be 
localized, the legislative approaches should 
think beyond internal mechanisms for 
dispute resolution. A very disparaging gap 
in this chapter of the constitution in the 
absence of outright mention of the 
electoral system applicable in the Kenyan 
jurisdiction whereas it opts to characterize 
the principles the system ought to 
subscribe to. This omission could be 
pointing to how many governments have 
taken elections and their outcomes, hither 
before they have not reminiscence 
insecurity that shakes the states in eco-
socio-political dimensions as seen this 
century. 
 Despite the above, the 2007 election 
was conducted by the Commission that 
preceded the IEBC, the Electoral 
Commission of Kenya (ECK). The existence 
of ECK was presumed to be the cause of the 
mismanagement of the Presidential 
elections in Kenya then. This is true at the 
same time lacks some merit, academically 
proven from this research. Some of the 
electoral management dynamics were 
internal to the EMB managers while quite a 
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number were external to the political 
architecture of the country.  
 A former commissioner (Kibira, 
2013) with the defunct Electoral 
Commission of Kenya has exonerated 
Samuel Kivuitu from blame over the 2007 
bungled presidential elections. Jack Tumwa 
said the team that conducted the elections 
was "discredited by public perception, and 
lacked the prerequisite finances and 
independence to discharge its mandate". 
“The truth of the matter is that the law 
required Kivuitu to release the results 
within the stipulated time, after 
ascertaining that the remaining votes 
would not make any difference,” Tumwa 
said. “Prior to the elections, he had pointed 
out problems in some parts of the country,” 
he said, adding that the commission’s 
proposal for consultations amongst parties 
fell on deaf ear. Vidija (2018) of Star-Times 
reported that the then Chairman of ECK 
Kivuitu during an interview said with a lot 
of conviction that tribalism was the 
primary inspiration for the contest 
between Raila and Kibaki. “We know the 
two parallels involved in this election but 
we can’t say [anything]," he said and 
defended himself by saying violence was 
inevitable regardless of who the winner 
would be. Kivuitu was indicted heavily in 
the court of public opinion but he hangs on 
to his job. “Never! I cannot resign [because] 
I will be seen as a coward, which I’m not," 
he told reporters. “I was the server, not the 
cook - if at all there was any cooking. If I’m 
given orders to serve you an eagle and you 
expected a chicken, then I’m not a party to 
the confusion. I only serve what I am 
offered - the rest are just stories." Prior 
Kivuitu had earned a good reputation 
internationally for the successful conduct 
of the 2002 elections and the 2005 
referendum on the Constitution. 
 The constitutional gaps and 
electoral management hurdles thereafter 
instigated a raft of measures towards 
revamping electoral management body 
fronted by political class, recommendation 
from Krieglar report, African Eminent 
personalities recommendations, and other 
actors. These led to the formation of the 
Grand National Coalition government and 
ultimate constitutional review which was 
consummated by the promulgation of the 
Constitution of Kenya 2010. The process of 
settling the EMB institutional and 
operational dynamics was followed by the 
disbandment of ECK. Vidija (2018) records, 
after the ECK, came to the IIEC which was 
set up on May 7, 2009. The commissioners 
were sworn in on May 11 that year with 
Issack Hassan as the Chairman. 
Commissioners included Simiyu Wasike, 
Winnie Guchu, Yusuf Nzibo, Davis Chirchir, 
Douglas Mwashigadi, Hamara Ibrahim 
Adan, Ken Nyaundi and Tiyah Galgalo. 
Hassan led the IIEC's transition into the 
Independent Electoral and Boundaries 
Commission and with it more complaints 
about poorly managed elections. The 
transitioning of IIEC came to a climax with 
the formation of IEBC in 2011 through the 
Independent Electoral and Boundaries 
Commission Act 2011. 
 
Kenya’s Electoral Management 
Architectural Context 
 Good electoral management is what 
all political class would need for the 
thriving of democracy but conversely 
deterioration of democracy when in crisis 
renews itself in Tyra-systemocracy 
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(application of tyranny using weak systems 
and institutions of governance). The spark 
for Kenya's firestorm of ethnic violence 
was lit inside a cavernous meeting hall in 
downtown Nairobi, where election officials 
over four days doctored vote counts, 
dismissed eye-popping irregularities, and 
thwarted monitoring by independent 
observers to deliver a razor-thin victory to 
President Mwai Kibaki. Observers who 
were allowed into the vote-tallying center 
on Dec. 29-30, hours before the results 
were announced, said there was so much 
systematic fraud by Kenya's government-
appointed election commission that it's 
impossible to know who really won. The 
extent of the commission's deceptions has 
faded into the background as more than 
800 Kenyans have been killed in ethnic 
clashes and police crackdowns. Official 
results gave Kibaki an edge of 231,728 
votes, or 2 percent, out of about 10 million 
casts. Initial results of an exit poll by the 
U.S.-funded International Republican 
Institute found that rival Raila Odinga had 
won by an 8 percent margin. The IRI says it 
will not release the poll until it has 
assessed the validity of the methodology 
(McClatchy, 2008). Despite the grave's 
happenings as noted by observers, the 
impunity revealed further a trend in 
electoral management dynamism that 
seemed to have rooted in Kenya. The 
engrained Tyra-systemocracy works 
within institutions led by compromised 
characters and where legislative loopholes 
thrive for the advantage of regimes seeking 
re-election. 
 McClatchy further sadly notes how 
election officials allowed five accredited 
Kenyan observers into the tallying center 
in Nairobi only in the final phase of vote-
counting. All said that the gravest cheating 
occurred in that room, where 
commissioners all appointed by Kibaki 
compiled returns before announcing them 
to the public. The long-serving chairman of 
Kenya's election commission played an 
active role in the deception, the observers 
said. The Electoral Commission of Kenya, 
an independent body whose members are 
appointed by the president was a largely 
different commission. As members faced 
term limits in the months before the vote, 
Kibaki facing the stiffest presidential 
challenge ever in Kenya packed the 22-
person body with 17 new commissioners. 
All were considered Kibaki allies, and none 
had ever run an election. "These people 
were criminals," said Ben Sihanya, a 
Stanford-educated constitutional law 
professor who also observed the tallying. 
 Kenya’s 2007 election in 
perspectives reveal dynamics surrounding 
how and what of the electoral management 
(actions of EMBs and political class), 
operations carried by ECK, Electoral 
system, Party contenders, Electoral 
campaign, Election results, and Voting 
Behaviour. The ECK’s inability to maintain 
confidence in the vote produced 
widespread protest and violence magnified 
the dynamics (Human Rights Watch, 2008) 
detrimentally. 
 On 27 December 2007, Kenyan 
voters participated in the fourth elections 
since the re-introduction of multi-party 
politics in 1991, casting ballots for the 
president and members of parliament 
Little violence occurred on election day, 
and observers considered the voting 
process well-organized. However, delay by 
the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) 
in announcing the results incited serious 
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unrest in the country (Bengali 2008). 
Independent analyses and the work of the 
Independent Review Commission to study 
the election revealed deep flaws in the vote 
tally process, undermining the credibility 
of the ECK’s official results (Kanyinga et al, 
2008). The NARC coalition, however, 
disintegrated over the issue of 
constitutional revision. The draft of the 
new constitution, produced at the Bomas 
Convention, hewed closely to the promises 
made by Kibaki ahead of the 2002 election. 
But Kibaki erased the curtailment of 
presidential powers in revisions of the 
draft, which was presented to voters in a 
2005 referendum Kimenyi and Shugart 
(2008). 
 Electoral Commission of Kenya 
(2005) Kibaki’s reversal led to Odinga, 
Musyoka, and others defecting from NARC 
and forming the Orange Democratic 
Movement (ODM). ODM campaigned 
vigorously against Kibaki’s version of the 
constitution, which was rejected 58–42%. 
Kenya’s electoral rules set three 
requirements to be elected president. A 
candidate must win the most votes in a 
nation-wide count, and secure at least 25% 
of the vote in five of any eight provinces. 
The presidential victor must also win the 
parliamentary seat in their own 
constituency. Kenya’s National Assembly is 
chosen by a first-past-the-post system in 
210 single-member constituencies. In 
addition to these elected seats, 12 MPs are 
allocated to parties in proportion to their 
elected seat total, along with two ex-officio 
members (Gibson and Long, 2009) 
 Kiage et al point that the political 
landscape shifted ahead of the 2007 
election with the demise of NARC and the 
emergence of ODM. Given the fracturing of 
NARC and the embryonic nature of PNU, 
ODM, and ODM-K, the National Assembly 
election featured a shifting set of parties 
and candidates. The presidential campaign 
centered heavily on Kibaki’s performance. 
His 2002 victory had generated such 
tremendous ‘‘euphoria’’ that Kenyans 
registered some of the highest support for 
democracy in the Afro barometer survey in 
2003 (2004). Kimenyi and Shugart (2008) 
assert, the constitutional revision also 
remained important to many voters. The 
Kibaki version of the constitution 
confirmed many voters’ fears that the 
government remained too strong and 
centralized. Again according to Anderson, 
central government power also 
undergirded the issue of majimbo (Swahili 
for ‘regions’), which implied the devolution 
of political responsibilities to lower levels 
of government (Anderson, 2005). In its 
analysis of the situation, European Union 
(2008) observed that International and 
domestic observers were near-unanimous 
that vote counting in the 2007 elections 
was flawed. Gibson and Long (2009) were 
additionally of the view Kibaki benefited 
from producing additional votes in seven 
provinces while losing votes in one; Odinga 
benefited from additional votes in one 
province and lost in seven. If we aggregate 
these net differences across provinces, we 
find that Kibaki benefited from 355,843 
extra votes in the official tally when 
compared to the exit poll, while Odinga lost 
57,951 votes, for a total of 413,794. 
 According to Brown (2003) and 
Fischer (2002) elections provide a 
legitimate and legal context in which 
citizens can express their opinions and 
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views. To Reilly (2002) and Reilly (2008), it 
is a means towards democracy and 
democratic governance. Elections are 
viewed in the public discourse as the first 
step towards the developing of democratic 
institutions and consolidating the 
democratization process (Kuar 1998:7). 
 Jeff Fischer (2002) adopts an 
argument that it is not the electoral process 
per se that triggers violence, but the 
breakdown of this process. Fischer does 
not contest the crucial role that elections 
have in the democratization process. He 
says, “it is difficult to identify any electoral 
surrogate that has brought about non-
conflictive transitions of power with the 
same consistency” (2002:2) - but believes 
that violence is induced by unethical 
actions that occur during the election cycle 
and which contribute to the breakdown of 
the electoral process. In understanding 
Fischer, the issue about surrogates tells the 
nature of systems, methods, and 
technologies which are often borrowed 
from mature democracies and mostly in 
the eleventh hour. It is therefore almost 
certain that incompatibilities are bound to 
take place out of these in electoral matters. 
It may be right to suggest that surrogate 
electoral systems will likely lead to 
conflicts. 
 While trying to understand 
presidential politics in Kenya, one has to 
examine the nature of party and ethnic 
politics (Lonsdale, 1994). Adar (1998) and 
Okoth and Ogot (2000) emphasize that it is 
through understanding of the place of 
ethnicity and party politics in Kenya that 
we can understand the history of 
presidential politics in the country. Ethnic 
groups have become vital building blocks 
for Kenya‘s democracy, as seen in the 
scholarship on ethnicity in Kenya. For 
many decades (Ajulu, 2002) is of the view 
that, access to the national cake in Kenya 
has been through ethnic balancing, even if 
not well balanced, but the intention has 
been visible. Using these multiparty 
elections - 1992, 1997, 2002 and 2007, I 
demonstrate how tensions have been 
precipitated by ethnic elites under various 
pretences.  
 Reaffirming the same thought line, 
(Murunga and Nasong’o, 2007) suggest, 
…the prospects for democracy in Kenya are 
contingent, to a large extent, upon 
restructuring the institutions of 
governance and concomitantly devolving 
power from the presidency. What comes to 
fore is that electoral politics and by and 
large electoral management suffice certain 
key dynamics that are just unique to Kenya. 
These include; party politics, ethnic 
mobilizations, the role of ethnic elites, non-
responsive institutions of governance, and 
deep centralization of power under the 
presidency has been causative factors to 
the perennial electoral conflicts which lead 
often to security locally and beyond 
national borders. 
 Previous literature on elections and 
conflict – both in the political science, and 
peace and conflict research fields according 
to Höglund, Jarstad, and Söderberg Kovacs 
(2009) were the first to systematically put 
together conflict-generating factors in a 
conceptual framework. The authors 
categorized these factors into three 
clusters related to the actors who 
participate in the electoral process, the 
electoral institutions, and the stake of 
elections. Conflict-generating factors, 
Höglund, Jarstad, and Söderberg Kovacs 
included an electoral system that generates 
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the concentration of power which may lead 
to violence, “weak or politicized electoral 
management bodies”, failed Security Sector 
Reforms or lack of “external security 
guarantees” (2009:548). These groups of 
scholars fail to raise issues pointing that 
security is state-owned machinery and in 
an election in which a state has an interest 
and electoral body is partially chosen by 
the government such as the constitution of 
Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK). 
Institutions are also good but what will 
internally weak ones achieve against their 
patrons. At this point, thinking of extra 
state institutions may possibly assist the 
internal weaknesses. 
 Electoral administration is mainly 
conducted by an electoral management 
body (EMB). EMBs conduct their activity 
following several principles: independence, 
impartiality, integrity, transparency, 
efficiency, professionalism, and service-
mindedness (Wall et al. 2006). The 
independence and impartiality of EMBs are 
often related to the EMB Model - whether 
or not the EMB is independent, 
governmental, or mixed; or party-based, 
expertise-based, or both (Wall et. al 2006). 
Independent and expertise-based models 
are considered in many parts of the world 
as the best EMBs for ensuring the 
independence and impartiality of decisions 
and actions. Models are very good whether 
governmental, semi-government, or 
independent. The role of managers in a 
great context has a key role in the 
directions electoral management take; this 
goes hand in hand with the behaviour of 
the individual managers. Systems must be 
supported by these people. 
 Electoral management can widely 
be viewed from the values of any EMBs, for 
Kenyan case, the EMB in place is IEBC. This 
body has a certain set mandate that guides 
its operations thus the embodiment of its 
independence given that the model in place 
now of electoral management is one where 
the EMBs are supposed to be independent. 
On this basis, the EMB in Kenya’s nine 
itemized mandate makes their value 
systems. One can project Kenya's electoral 
gaps or strengths by closely examining the 
said values. According to the IEBC 
website (IEBC, 2017), the Commission is 
responsible for conducting or supervising 
referenda and elections to any elective 
body or office established by the 
Constitution, and any other elections as 
prescribed by an Act of Parliament and, in 
particular, for: 
i. The continuous registration of 
voters and revision of the voter's 
roll; 
ii. The delimitation of constituencies 
and wards; 
iii. The regulation of political parties 
process; 
iv. The settlement of electoral disputes; 
v. The registration of candidates for 
elections; 
vi. Voter education; 
vii. The facilitation of the observation, 
monitoring, and evaluation of 
elections; 
viii. The regulation of money spent by a 
candidate or party in respect of any 
election; 
ix. The development of a code of 
conduct for candidates and parties; 
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x. The monitoring of compliance with 
legislation on the nomination of 
candidates by parties. 
 The Commission shall exercise its 
powers and perform its functions in 
accordance with the Constitution and 
national legislation. From the above this 
study can conclude that: 
 First, a purview into the mandate 
reveals very well stated items but the 
authenticity of execution by many EMBs 
where IEBC is included sometimes 
portrays a bit of a lacuna. Suggestively, to 
say the least, the percentage of 
independence exercised by the electoral 
bodies towards elections and in ensuring 
security (freedom from risk, fear, and 
threat) is maintained and achieved remains 
very insignificant. Secondly, EMBs 
supposed role to register voters is a 
process that involves using all necessary 
means to prepare ground and 
infrastructure for political competition 
among political parties. This should be 
actively carried to discourage political 
parties attempting to hijack EMBs role in 
the pretext of rallying their perceived 
strongholds.  This is because political 
parties under EMBs supervision cannot 
compete when they already have their 
voters known due to registration 
mobilization, an EMBs’ work. Thirdly, 
EMBs independence will remain as 
required if such bodies were to be in 
control of their own mandate, free from 
intrusion to avoid visible and potent lines 
of collision (such as EMB verses political 
parties; EMB verses Security; EMB verses 
National Administration; and EMB verses 
Citizens) as often seen in Kenya’s polls. 
 In ‘Electoral Disputes Resolution’ by 
Krieglar (2011), in Kenya in 2007, one can 
see the impact of low trust in EMB and 
state institutions. In the 2007 election, the 
casting of ballots went well, but ensuing 
irregularities (both real and alleged), bad 
communication strategies, and underlying 
grievances combined to fuel violence. 
Following the election, rumors spread as 
allegations and conflicting reports from 
polling stations suggested that there were 
irregularities in the results process. 
 Krieglar then notes that the EMB, 
rather than addressing the issues head on, 
simply announced results. Then, to make 
matters worse, the EMB revealed it had 
been pressured to do so. The public and 
opposition groups were skeptical of the 
electoral process already and this 
confusion fueled anger among opposition 
supporters. The issues of electoral 
management addressed in this article 
surrounds; institutional trust and 
weaknesses, poor strategies, doctored 
result processes, neglect, and political 
patronage which hinders independence. 
Krieglar further points out that, 
weaknesses in the Kenya EMB were not 
evident on the surface of the 2002 election 
process. Yet there were systemic issues 
and weaknesses that were not resolved 
with between-elections support. 
 Election security planning and 
training are also key to electoral conflict 
prevention because they can contribute to 
a system that can better absorb shocks. … a 
coordinated approach between EMBs and 
the security sector makes a huge difference 
in the planning and training done within 
each institution. Forming a joint operations 
center manned by both EMB and security 
officials has proven instrumental in many 
elections observes Lisa ibid. Lisa highlights 
the essence of security in managing 
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elections and in perpetuating good 
electoral practices. 
 Discussing electoral management in 
relation to security then as some earlier 
cited literature suggest would then require 
addressing things to do with: 
(i) Principles of operations and role of 
managers (Wall et al’, 2006), 
(ii) Institutional trust and weaknesses, 
strengthening of overall 
operational strategies such as 
planning and training, good 
transparent and efficient result 
dissemination, and operating 
above political patronage by 
electoral officers (Krieglar, 
2011), and  
(iii) Having adequate preparation 
time (Obala, 2012).  
 December 2007 presidential 
election shocked the Country and world. 
The 2007/8 violence lasted two months, 
during which time 1,133 Kenyans were 
killed, over 600,000 driven from their 
homes, and more than 110,000 private 
properties were destroyed (Global Centre 
for the Responsibility to Protect, 2013). It 
is this wave that later led to the emerging 
effects on East African regional security. 
The internal dynamics could not contain 
the normal life and business. The condition 
that followed made operations in an 
interconnected region difficult. The 
landlocked Countries could not access the 
Mombasa port with their exports nor reach 
for their imports, the delays, destructions 
on transit, cross border populations, and 
still within the internal displacements. 
 In a bit of comparative evaluation of 
the 2007 electoral management and the 
one that followed, Obala (2012) draws 
some lines of why the latter didn’t turn into 
similar fate as 2007. He observes that as 
always, elections, as common in Africa and 
other developing world is winning by all 
means. Being a political process, using all 
available means is an acceptable norm 
except where values are relegated as 
subjects to be addressed after assumption 
of leadership, and then the ease of society 
breaking into conflict is not remote. The 
preparations included the promulgation of 
a new constitution that set the stage for the 
existence of the Independent Electoral and 
Boundaries Commission (IEBC). This body 
came into being after the Interim 
Independent Electoral Commission (IIEC) 
was formed to cause the transition from 
the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) 
into also new constitutional order. 
 In referring to the 2013 elections he 
views a marked difference observing 
Kenya’s next Presidential elections are due 
to be held in an environment of great 
uncertainty for lords of impunity and 
violence. The uncertainty is also on the 
new political game – that at the same time 
reduces the attraction to the presidency for 
the resources it doled to the loyalists and 
sycophants. But also provides ethnic 
kingpins with the opportunity to operate 
within a limited sphere predominated by 
their ethnic groups (Obala, 2012). 
Secondly, the other marked difference was 
that the incumbent president was retiring 
after having served his last term in office. 
This meant his hold on the normal 
institutions of transition could well be low 
key. This scenario necessarily made the 
2013 elections full of threats for a Country 
coming from conflict-related to elections. 
Post-conflict elections are normally very 
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volatile and hence a security concern. 
Election campaigns in Kenya have often 
focused on internal issues which often take 
the nature of ethnic agenda, ethnic 
grouping, and silent role of government. 
Amidst emerging complex regional 
dynamics, there are emerging internal 
sobering political dynamics that observes 
Obala. These are compounded by 
synonymous traits in Kenya’s political 
scene. 
 Third, to make 2013 a security 
concern and very different from the 2007 
elections was the number of elective offices 
that were ushered in by the new 
constitution’s people’s demand for 
devolution. And, fourth, this election was 
being conducted within a short preparation 
time yet it was a recommendation after the 
2007 elections that there is a need for 
adoption of new technology in the 
subsequent elections. A marked similarity 
that the 2013 elections possessed which 
2007 had was the characterization of the 
political climate by a seemingly close 
contestation of the presidency.  The 
political scene in Kenya is largely split 
along ethnic lines; at the 2007 election 
Kibaki mainly garnered the Kikuyu vote 
while Odinga was largely supported by Luo 
and Kalenjin groups... Odinga and Kenyatta 
are from the Luo and Kikuyu ethnic groups 
respectively. This immediately frames the 
electoral decision as an ethnic one once 
again (Cummings, 2012). 
 The 2013 election could have as 
well been another security hazard. The 
potential flashpoints for the 2013 elections 
are more numerous than in 2007, including 
many impoverished, remote and rural 
parts of the Country. The Kenyan National 
Security and Intelligence Service identified 
27 out of 47 Counties as having 
considerable potential to degenerate into 
electoral violence (Global Centre for the 
Responsibility to Protect, 2013).  
 Finally, in 2013, another institution 
the judiciary in its rightful role as an actor 
in elections acted as an arbiter after the 
IEBC was felt incompetent, and through the 
first Supreme Court sitting, the election 
outcome was upheld. The role of 
institutions in enhancing positively 
security complexities out of elections looks 
a vital mechanism in the transformation of 
elections regionally. Kenya’s peaceful 
elections mean a lot to regional security. 
The definition of security must not be 
limited to the traditional view of focusing 
on external aggression and internal state 
dynamics but one that looks at economic 
wellbeing as well and also postulating 
extra-territorial effects as matters 
pertinent to an all-round definition of 
security. 
 In one of his writings, a renowned 
historian Prof. Amutabi narrates 
chronologically that Kenya has had 
elections in 1964, 1966, 1969, 1974, 1979, 
1983, 1988, 1992, 1997, 2002, and 2007. 
Between 1964 and 1988, the elections 
were held under KANU. In these elections, 
the ethnic competition was not as 
pronounced as later became the case in 
liberalized politics under a multiparty 
political dispensation, from 1992. After 
1992, it became clear that ethnicity 
mattered in national politics, and Kenyans 
for the first time started to vote on what 
was clearly ethnic basis (Amutabi,2009). 
 It is proper to note an argument not 
far from this literature that competitions in 
Kenya’s elections were terse at 
independence between the two dominant 
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parties KANU and KADU where the latter 
emerged a supreme majoritarian elite 
ruling organ. However, first, to pick some 
notable issues in this citation, one then 
would link the aspects of competition, 
multiparty politics, and ethnicity to 
election security/insecurity since it is 
during 1992 and after that spillover of 
chaotic elections were felt in a wide scale. 
Secondly, the literature points to the 
suppression of electoral conflicts which 
rightly only needed time to brood and 
explode at a maturity time not known. 
 Kenya’s influence in the East Africa 
region is measured successfully from its 
contribution to the peaceful referendum in 
South Sudan. Additionally, the young 
Somali citizens living and studying in 
Kenya need peace in order for their 
expectations to greatly influence a future 
Somalia.  This means a peaceful election in 
Kenya guided by among others an 
independent electoral commission and a 
progressive constitution as they watch will 
have a greater impact in influencing the 
way the Country will move forward and 
continue affecting positively her neighbor's 
politics and economy. 
 In confirmation to this, Obala 
(2012) highlights the critical role of 
Kenya’s stability to the region thus, the 
stability of Kenya after the 2012-2013 
elections are vital for entire Sudan’s 
economic development. Most of the 
Countries neighboring Kenya within the 
larger East African Community (EAC) have 
interests at stake and will be directly 
affected by Kenya’s stability or instability 
after the coming elections. Though his 
emphasis is pointed to Sudan with the 
‘South’ in mind, the strategic importance of 
Kenya in the region was demonstrated by 
the demolition of the Kenya-Uganda 
railway line in Kibera in Kenya’s city of 
Nairobi. 
 Above all, having led the regional 
Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development (IGAD) peace process that 
yielded the CPA, Kenya has a particularly 
strong interest in South Sudan. This 
position is agreeable, one because the 
Country is an industrial hub to the 
developing states around, secondly, it is a 
transport corridor through its airways to 
such states, and thirdly, it offers an efficient 
port for export and import business into 
the region. More so, the reconstruction of 
the two countries is having nationalities 
from across Africa among whom Kenyans 
are part of the human capital present in the 
capital cities of the two states. 
 Kenya’s role in the East Africa 
Region (EAR) remains significant. In the 
wake of South Sudan struggles to stabilize 
as a state amidst differences with parent-
state, Sudan, it is increasingly becoming 
clear that a regional arbiter is needed as 
well as stable regional economic power for 
closer integration to continue. Kenya’s geo- 
politics makes these necessary.  
 In general terms, electoral violence 
in Kenya is not new. At least 4,433 Kenyans 
have been killed and over 1.8 million 
people displaced by such violence since 
1993 (Global Centre for the Responsibility 
to Protect, 2013). The 2007/8 post-election 
violence was, however, unprecedented. 
 
Election Management Architecture in 
Volatile Regions 
 The East African Region stands out 
as a very vibrant regional block in Africa to 
date in comparison to other similar regions 
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yet without a doubt one thing that pulls it 
back is her volatility due to electoral 
challenges. A view of Uganda portrays a 
country that has gone through cycles of 
post-independent struggles of military 
instabilities and violence to be where it is 
today. However, it is creeping towards 
electoral conflicts whose root causes are 
long-regime related. Rwanda as another 
country in East Africa has cut a niche of a 
clean and effective business destination, a 
practice very common with territorially 
small states which have taken off 
economically. Despite this, it continues to 
have a predicted periodic election in favor 
of President Paul Kagame. Is the strength of 
democracy measured by economic 
stability? One can still ask if a country can 
sustain democracy with a weakened 
economy. Issues of term limits and human 
rights are related to good governance and 
falling in the same category with elections 
hence they define the stability of states. 
 Tanzania has had its challenges to 
volatility too though struggling with forced 
stability in a fast liberalized world, unlike 
past years when it was the joy of every 
Tanzania to follow Mwalimu Julius 
Nyerere. The country experiences a 
struggle between the good historicals of 
Tanzania about Mwalimu from the old 
generation and the comparable ‘Tanzania’ 
in the minds of contemporary citizens as 
far as the economy, politics, and other 
social issues are concerned. This is drawn 
from globalization factors that must be 
used to craft its stability. It is notable that 
Julius Kambarage Nyerere was an astute 
sociologist who understood times well – he 
adopted multiparty politics when many 
African countries were still hesitant and 
ruled his maximum 10 years though he was 
a strong believer of a one-party system. 
The state makers in Tanzania ought to 
measure up with his strides in the context 
of 21st Century eco-political environment. 
 Burundi, South Sudan, and Kenya 
are very volatile to elections. Not to 
mention Somalia which is yet to exercise 
unassisted sovereignty and carry out an 
equivalent of a standard election since it 
was nursed from state collapse. Kenya 
experiences a 5-year electoral cycle/circle 
predictable violence which makes the 
country lose almost 4 years in economic 
development (2 years before and 2 years 
after elections) from electoral activities 
due to failure to successively craft ‘the form 
– state’. Burundi, on one hand, is a country 
stuck at making strides beyond 
constitutional rule from a kind of chiefdom. 
South Sudan on the other hand is volatile 
due to attempts to self-consciousness of 
state formation where physical, perceived, 
and real identities must be integrated to 
take off.   
 East Africa (Centre for Strategic and 
International Studies, 2020) is one of the 
most conflicted and poorly-governed 
corners of the world. Issues in the region, 
including the implementation of Kenya’s 
new constitution, the ongoing efforts to 
bring order and government to Somalia; 
the frozen yet volatile Ethiopian-Eritrean 
border dispute; and piracy in the Gulf of 
Aden and the Indian Ocean are but some 
causes of conflict and weakness in 
governance. 
Electoral Management: Dynamisms and 
Regional Histories 
 The prism of history is rich in 
understanding electoral management 
architecture. East Africa region’s 
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experience is a context of the African wide 
view and practicalities. Thomas Otieno 
Juma in E-International Relations asserts; 
the election history in Africa describes 
what the recent changeovers/ continuity 
has been in Africa. African countries that 
have had elections recently such as; 
Uganda, ‘Burundi’, Sudan, Rwanda, Kenya, 
Congo Brazzaville, Togo, Mali, and Zambia 
have experienced continuity of 
incumbents; The other category of states 
like Tanzania, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria, and 
South Africa have experienced 
changeovers; A third category which is 
similar to the first category to some extent 
have extended their regimes using 
elections. In this category we have Burundi, 
South Sudan, and DRC whose elections is 
now due in December; A unique 
circumstantial election/transition scenario 
emerging include Sierra Leone, Ethiopia, 
South Africa, and now Zimbabwe; Finally, 
there are only two cases recently where 
incumbents have been defeated as was 
witnessed in Ghana and Nigeria. With the 
dawn of democracy, many thought 
elections would revert the independent 
African strongman syndrome; it has 
worsened under the legitimization of 
available governmental institutions. 
Elections have not brought about changes, 
but the continuity of the unwanted through 
approvals at whatever cost. The history of 
elections strikes an attitude of fear of 
unconducted elections just as much as the 
outcome of any elections (Juma, 2018). 
 Nyirabu notes that Tanzania 
Mainland (Tanganyika) began her 
independence in 1961 under the 
Independence Constitution which provided 
for an elected government, parliamentary 
supremacy, competitive multi-party 
politics, and liberal democratic principles 
and judicial independence. A year after 
independence, the Republican Constitution 
of 1962 was enacted ushering in the 
presidential system. 
 Seemingly, the adoption of the 
systems of government including elections 
did not match African interests from the 
very beginning of independence as can be 
observed in Nyerere’s statement from 
Mwipopo (2011) “the first President of 
Tanzania argued that, in contemporary 
Africa, the multiparty system had no 
reason to exist. According to Mwalimu 
Nyerere, unique African societies did not 
need a multi-party system”. This is an 
indication that elections accruing from the 
same were also not desirable and hence 
how could such activities be held to yield 
successful results for a system whose 
defiance was not hidden. The belief system 
of leaders in the immediate post-
independence influenced electoral 
management dynamics and this is possible 
to bear acceptance broadly in a region that 
was thinking integration then. 
 The point of argument raised by 
Nyerere above was adopted by many 
immediate post-independent African 
leaders with little semblance yet the open 
reasoning looked to be the same. One can 
compare what the same statement meant 
to Kenyan political elites vis a’ vis their 
Tanzanian counterparts where it probably 
meant unity in line with ujamaa policy. 
However, the assertion that African 
societies did not need multipartism has 
been the greatest impediment to the 
practice of democracy used in favor of a 
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ruling regime to avert healthy choice to the 
electorates. 
 Introspection into Tanzania’s 
electoral system used currently First Past 
the Post (FPTP), pluralism where the 
Presidential, Parliamentary, and Councilor 
Candidate who secures the simple majority 
of votes is declared to be the winner has 
remained to build comparatively peaceful 
atmosphere within and in the region. One 
may ask whether this is a product of 
institutional or legal frameworks at work 
or a foundation of some hidden set system 
at work. 
 An important point to understand is 
that different electoral systems exist and 
these have been used in East Africa. IFES 
(2014), points that an election system is a 
method by which voters make a choice 
between options, often in an election or on a 
policy referendum. An electoral system 
contains rules for valid voting, and how 
votes are fed and aggregated to yield a final 
result.  
 The choice of electoral system is one 
of the most important institutional 
decisions for any democracy (Reynolds et 
‘al, 2005). They say, in almost all cases the 
choice of a particular electoral system has a 
profound effect on the future political life 
of the country concerned, and electoral 
systems, once chosen, often remain fairly 
constant as political interests solidify 
around and respond to the incentives 
presented by them. Electoral system choice 
is a fundamentally political process, rather 
than a question to which independent 
technical experts can produce a single 
‘correct answer’. 
 The point raised by Reynolds et ‘al 
is very contestable because choice of 
electoral system is one thing but its 
operationalization is altogether another 
issue. Why raise this? It is because, a 
country like Kenya at the time of 2007 
elections had moved from governmental to 
semi- governmental through even a 
referendum testing but the results were 
not impressive. Systems by no means are 
very good especially when handled by the 
right people within the frameworks that 
direct systems operations. 
 To the proponents of electoral 
systems (Reynolds et ‘al), the consideration 
of political advantage is almost always a 
factor in the choice of electoral systems 
from among the many that exist; Firstly, 
there are plurality/majority systems under 
which Fast Past the Post, Block Vote BV), 
Party Block Vote (PBV), Alternative Vote 
(AV), The Two Round- System (TRS) exist.  
Secondly, there are proportional 
representation systems where there are 
systems such as List Proportional 
Representation (LPR) and The Single 
Transferable Vote (STV). In the third 
categorization, there are mixed systems 
under which there are Mixed-Member 
Systems (MMS) and Parallel Systems. 
Fourthly, other systems exist as the Single 
Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV), The 
Limited Vote (LV), and the Borda F (BC). 
Finally, electoral systems can take hybrid 
formats of the existing systems. 
 Any electoral system should 
cultivate diversity in the representation 
and extent of representation in the 
legislature and that it should be one that is 
fair to both voters and parties Haysom 
(2003). In discussing Proportional 
Representation (PR), Elklit (2003: 122), “ I 
see it as an umbrella concept, which is 
particularly attractive because it is 
nonspecific, but also because it allows for 
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the inclusion of specific systemic elements, 
which taken alone must detract from 
proportionality. This is the formal electoral 
thresholds in Germany and Denmark. 
These are electoral systems whose main 
objective is to achieve a reasonable degree 
of proportionality.” 
 In a First Past the Post system 
(FPTP), sometimes known as a plurality 
single-member district system, the winner 
is the candidate with the most votes, but 
not necessarily an absolute majority of the 
votes. When this system is used in multi-
member districts it becomes the Block Vote 
(BV). Voters have as many votes as there 
are seats to be filled, and the highest-
polling candidates fill the positions, 
regardless of the percentage of the vote 
they actually achieve. Majoritarian systems, 
such as the Australian Alternative Vote 
(AV) and the French two-round System 
(TRS) try to ensure that the winning 
candidate receives an absolute majority 
(i.e. over fifty percent). Each system, in 
essence, makes use of voters' second 
preferences to produce a majority winner if 
one does not emerge from the first round 
of voting (www.aceproject.org). 
 Despite FPTP’s popularity, it has 
some reservations in some places where it 
has been used because of inherent 
instabilities. This means that the use of 
specifically one model of the electoral 
system may have its disadvantages. For a 
period of 20 years (International IDEA, 
2005), from 1977 to 1997, the FPTP 
electoral system seemed to have ushered in 
an era of instability, principally because of 
the formation of coalitions without 
common principles and the pursuit of 
narrow self-interest by political parties. 
The non-Congress opposition parties 
(without the communists) took over in 
government in 1977 by uniting into a 
composite entity, the Janata Party. It split 
within two years. In December 1989, a 
successor party, the Janata Dal, came to 
power, supported by the communist 
parties and the Hindu revivalist Bharatiya 
Janata Party (BJP); this government lasted 
ten months. At the general election of 1996, 
no party was able to form a stable 
government. 
 The manifestation of the three 
models (governmental, mixed model, and 
independent model) of electoral 
management in Kenya’s history adds to the 
electoral dynamics. The governmental 
model is the longest-used spanning 39 
years and encompassing two first 
independent regimes. Its implementation 
into the electoral politics saw; executive 
overbearing through direct appointments 
of cronies as EMB managers, and second to 
this, using security agencies and Provincial 
Administration (PA) to run elections giving 
accountability only to the President. With 
many dissents arising from the weaknesses 
in this model, hardly did Kenya attain a 
Mixed Model perfectly. What emerged in 
the aftermath was a unique format 
initiated by the legislature and the 
executive through the Inter-Parliamentary 
Party Group (IPPG) in 1997 towards the 
end of the Moi regime. This unique method 
addressed the inclusive appointment of 
electoral managers and media freedoms 
but much of EMBs as to secretariat and 
operations somehow remained a reserve of 
government through funding. The 
internal dynamics of state hand in logistics 
and other management areas partly led to 
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the 2007/8 election violence. The loose 
legal frameworks made President Kibaki 
exude executive powers for his benefit 
prior to the 2007 election. The 
independent electoral model has a short 
stint in Kenya starting from the inception 
of IIEC to the IEBC era that is from 2010 to 
date. This model has seen Kenya through a 
national referendum, several by-elections, 
one general election in 2013. It is yet to 
oversee well functional political party 
management structures. Much of its 
weaknesses arise from weaknesses 
surrounding the conscious of its 
independence internally and externally 
through impediments of budgeting 
constraints, the government wanting to 
involve, and over expecting and suspicious 
public. 
 Uganda’s case differs from other 
surrounding states of the East Africa 
Region according to Mutibwa because of 
what he refers to as the obvious political 
climate that has existed- coups and 
takeovers which are insecurity in 
themselves. Its elections evaluation covers 
mostly the many years of Museveni 
regimes because the Country had 
numerous years of instability. However, 
earlier elections had many observations 
surrounding issues like alliances, electoral 
procedures to be followed, individual 
status, and the Buganda factor. In 1961, 
Obote, as UPC leader, issued a statement in 
which he outlined a strategy for persuading 
Buganda to participate in the forthcoming 
constitutional conference to prepare for 
independence. He invited the Lukiiko to 
join hands with the UPC and form a 
"partnership" during the conference … 
(Mutibwa, 1982). 
 After the Constitutional Conference, 
the next major process that greatly affected 
the fortunes of UPC and the Country as a 
whole was the elections of 1962. A 
unanimous consensus had been arrived at 
that important election of March 1961, in 
view of the boycott, they could not 
constitute the basis for governance. 
However, much as the neo-traditionalists 
had gotten in place an electoral procedure 
in accord with their desire, they did not as 
yet have an electoral machine. Such 
machinery was to be launched on Saturday, 
June 10, 1961, at a mammoth 
demonstration against the election the 
previous March of a DP government led by 
Benedicto Kiwanuka (Hancock, 1970). 
 Kiwanuka's `sins' were three 
according to Hancock: he was a Catholic 
who had opposed the neo-traditionalists; 
he had fought the elections in Buganda 
despite the boycott, and he was a 
commoner who had dared set himself 
above the Kabaka. The movement to lead 
the resistance to DP was called Kabaka 
Yekka (KY which meant Kabaka only). Its 
principal objectives were neo-traditionalist 
in character: to see that political changes 
do not destroy the good customs and 
traditions. . . of Buganda; and, not to allow 
anybody to be above the Kabaka. 
 In the period following Uganda’s 
independence attained in 1962, political, 
social, and economic dynamics started to 
manifest themselves as citizens developed 
an interest in the country’s democracy. 
Stating again on Uganda’s electoral politics, 
Ogwang, (2007), however, points out that 
prior to independence, elections were not 
much valued and the issues preoccupying 
most politics by 1964 being handling of the 
lost counties by then under Buganda but 
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claimed by Bunyoro. The elections then 
went on recess for over 18 years only to be 
conducted in 1980 through efforts of the 
Chairman of the Military Commission, H.E 
(late) Paulo Muwanga. Important to point 
is that the political environment led to this 
recess. It might not be true as Ogwang 
suggests that elections were not valued, 
rather it is possible there were no 
equivalent systems of running elections 
instituted at independence. All references 
on politics were centered on the executives 
who took over reigns from the colonial 
regimes. 
 Ogwang (2007) records that 
election went on recess for another 14 
years as the National Resistance Movement 
(NRM) reconstituted its regime. Through 
the Commission of Constituent Assembly 
(CCA) of 1993 to Interim Electoral 
Commission (IEC) of 1995 to the Electoral 
Commission (EC) of 1997, Uganda has 
consistently held elections whose head is a 
Presidential appointee. On 18th November 
2002, His Excellency the President of 
Uganda Yoweri K. Museveni appointed a 
new Commission, chaired by Eng. Dr. B.M. 
Kiggundu. With challenges of 
reconstitution of an EMB, though operating 
on the governmental model, the 
contribution to regional instability has not 
been measurably felt in the East Africa 
Region.   
 The interesting practice of electoral 
management as a determinant to power 
control and democratic avenue to usher in 
development has somehow been evasive to 
Africa. A discourse into it portrays a 
sanitizing process for leaders to fulfill the 
Western democratic ideals. There is a 
larger portion of states, the former French 
colonies, and others who conduct elections 
with obvious outcomes at state 
expenditure. The Francophone countries of 
Rwanda and Burundi in the East African 
Region have been slowly developing their 
electoral bodies and conducting elections 
after years of Hutu – Tutsi conflicts. 
Though most of their intrastate conflicts 
have taken the tribal dimensions and led to 
regional security effects, the elections so 
far held have not exploded into a serious 
security issue except for suspicions on such 
basis. Other regional countries like Somalia 
are just coming out of the many years of 
state failure while South Sudan filled with 
many dictatorial regimes has been 
continuously contending with how to 
attain stability. 
 The ‘youngest’ African state, South 
Sudan through the regional and global 
support held its nascent Country’s last 
elections in April 2010 when the region 
was an autonomous part of Sudan as part 
of a 2005 peace deal with the Khartoum 
government according to Kuacjok (2013) 
and will hold its first polls in probably in 
2015 if there is no change. 
 There is a growing trend towards 
elections as a means of representation in 
Africa. What this portends is that 
democracy is appealing to many political 
players. Vorrath asserts that multiparty 
elections have become frequent events in 
almost all countries of sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA). But in 2010 and 2011 an 
exceptionally high number of elections 
have been held. By mid-2011 presidential 
and/or parliamentary elections had taken 
place in 20 countries. While voting has 
become a regular occurrence in many of 
these countries, has it been accompanied 
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by an improvement in democratic quality? 
Vorrath (2011). The question of quality is 
what drags electoral management in this 
thought because silently it is a question of 
how elections are conducted and their 
value to democracy and much more a 
question of holding elections vis a vis 
making meaning to electoral decisions.   
 According to Vorrath (2011), quality 
has also been called into question by 
electoral violence and insecurity. Insecurity 
still seems to be commonly associated with 
voting in SSA, with eight of the 20 countries 
witnessing downward security trends in 
the context of recent elections. A popular 
line of thought which might be very 
satisfactory to tyrants in Africa is what 
(Lindberg 2006) suggests regular elections, 
even if flawed and imperfect, improve 
democratic quality over time. It is anti- 
quality and not bothered by the outcomes 
of the imperfect elections. This category of 
thought out rightly views elections as 
rubber stamps of illegitimacy thus pointers 
of their nature to perpetuate insecurity. 
 
Survival of One State – Survival of All: 
Security in The Era of Regionalization 
 
Given the many scenarios of electoral 
dynamics breaking security fabrics of 
existing states and how the threats 
spread to affect the periphery from 
the core. The realist order must be 
urgently supported by the neo-
liberalist order for survival of global 
system. While independence in 
electoral management 
operationalization remains key state 
issues, interdependence in 
containment of threat is no reserve to 
incapacitated states in a fast 
interlocking regional community of 
states. The complimentarity effect in 
security of neighbouring states ought 
to be strengthened theoretically 
through regional institutions. 
 
 Keith Suter makes very strong 
speculation of the world order 
characteristic to the 21st century from a 
business perspective that confirms the 
dependent nature of states in a globalizing 
world. Suter (2008) uses the business 
management technique of scenario 
planning to look at how the global order 
could evolve. It speculates on four ‘futures’: 
a continuation of the current order, so that 
much of what we currently see will 
continue well into the future (‘Steady 
State’); greater international co-operation 
via a strengthened United Nations (‘World 
State’); the continued decline of national 
governments in the running of economies 
with transnational corporations filling the 
vacuum (‘Earth Inc’); and a breakdown in 
both the system of nation-states and 
transnational corporations with greater 
chaos at the national and international 
levels (‘Wild State’).  Suter affirms a steady-
state situation in enhanced cooperation – 
world state scenario with a weakening 
government. 
 As American explorer Nicholas 
Hagger said, "The only way to realize the 
United World standard is the globalist 
phase of development of one of the 
powerful civilizations. If North American 
civilization becomes openly imperialist and 
decides to create a Confederate Empire aka 
American type, this standard may exist 
throughout the expansionist phase of its 
development." "We are currently 
cooperating with anyone who can make the 
entire world States forget about the 
mysterious force called sovereignty. And 
we constantly deny what we do in reality," 
said Arnold Joseph Toynbee. Toynbee 
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headed Chatham House for thirty years -- 
the Royal Institute of International Affairs 
(RIIA), the main West "think tank." And in a 
unique way it combined the qualities of the 
deepest academic scientist and 
experienced political swindler, puppeteer, 
on account of which dozens, if not 
hundreds of different subversive special 
operations. He knew what he was talking 
about. What is globalization and how does 
it relate to sovereignty? Schematically, it 
looks like a combination of two 
phenomena. The first phenomenon is of 
geopolitical origin and is called 
"glocalization." It denotes erosion and 
destruction of states and sovereignties 
with the transfer of state powers and 
prerogatives upwards -- in global and 
regional (uniting several countries within 
the region) structures and downwards, in 
local -- domestic regions and 
municipalities. The second phenomenon is 
related to the civilization factor, which is 
"fragmentation" -- identities fragmentation 
combined with the integration of 
economies. Moreover, any identity -- 
civilizational (religious and cultural), 
national, social, political, ideological -- is 
fragmented. And its fragmented in order to 
strike out any self from them, replacing it 
with an economy that will lead to a single 
denominator, which is from the Western 
test tubes. In other words, the globalization 
goal is to destroy and dismantle all 
communities -- from family to state. To 
destroy all forms of collective 
consciousness, to pit them against each 
other, to divide them, to organize the war 
chaos of all against all, and then to sit atop 
the pyramid, managing the contradictions 
of cogs and atoms, rubbing his hands and 
pouring oil on the fire (Annonymous, 
2019). 
 Hans Morgenthau (Al-Rodhan, 
2007c) once wrote that: “International 
relations is something not to be taken for 
granted, but something to be understood 
and to be changed and, more particularly, 
to be changed beyond the present limits of 
its political structure and organization. 
Here lies indeed the ultimate theoretical 
and practical justification for our interest 
in a theory of international relations.” 
 Given that security and prosperity 
are highly dependent on cooperative 
relations with other states, we cannot 
assume that relations between states are 
necessarily principally governed by 
competition. Increased interdependence 
means that absolute gains are possible and 
that global politics ought not to be a priori 
zero-sum as realism suggests. This implies 
that even if a state possesses a 
disproportionate degree of power, other 
states may not form alliances against it. 
Indeed, it is far more likely in today’s world 
that they would ally themselves with the 
most powerful state, if that power were 
constituted primarily through capacities 
other than solely military power Al-
Rodhan, 2007a). 
 Realism’s state-centrism (Al-
Rodhan, 2007c) also leads to a conception 
of the global system that is too narrow, 
resulting in the neglect of numerous non-
state actors that help to account for the 
dynamics and relations inside the global 
system. Moreover, limiting the study of IR 
to the distribution of material capabilities 
between states neglects other types of 
power and motivators of action that 
constitute identities other than that of the 
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rational, egoistic sovereign state — such as 
ethnic and gender identities. In my view, 
the conception of the global system must 
be widened and, moreover, an idealist 
dimension must be added to its ontology 
(i.e., what exists). 
 In the 21st century, therefore, 
survival of one state is essential to all 
others. Al-Rodhan (2007c) symbiotic 
realism outlines a governance structure 
that takes into account the predilections of 
human nature. Whether it is achievable is 
another discourse. To him, symbiotic 
realism helps explain why today the US, for 
example, can lead without having to 
confront alliances from other major 
powers. It also indicates that a hegemony 
based on consent may provide the best 
means at present of mitigating the 
consequences of the interlocking 
dimensions of human nature, globalization, 
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